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Summary 
This Report makes recommendations to the Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills for its policies affecting students residing in England. The Government subsidises 
higher education in England by offering a specified number of students guaranteed access 
to loans with favourable terms and conditions. At present, students do not have to start 
making any repayments on their loans until they are out of higher education and are 
earning above £21,000 a year. These loans are time limited and any outstanding debt is 
written off after 30 years. By providing favourable terms and conditions on student loans, 
the Government loses around 45p on every £1 it loans out. 
The administration of these loans, in relation to students who reside in England, is shared 
by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Student Loans Company—
an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body. Our Report highlights a number of 
weaknesses in the management of this key financial commitment and we are concerned 
that Government is rapidly approaching a tipping point for the financial viability of the 
student loans system. 
Forecasting future debt is vital to managing the public finances. In general this is done by 
using Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB). Under this approach, the Government 
estimates how much it will lose on a student loan at the point it pays out. Our Report 
uncovers a worrying record of miscalculation of the Department's estimate of the RAB 
charge. More disturbing, is the fact that independent forecasters have been recommending 
improvements to the Government’s methodology for some years, which the Department 
has ignored. We recommend that it starts to listen now. The size of this problem is put into 
stark relief by the fact that the Minister estimates that the size of outstanding debt will 
increase sevenfold to more than £330 billion by 2044. 
The Government is already struggling to collect student loans effectively. We therefore 
recommended an urgent review of the sustainability of the student loan system. As part of 
that review, the Government would do well to look abroad for examples of best practice 
and must come back with a clear timescale for this review. 
The student loan-book is an asset that may be sold for financial gain to the public purse. 
This was done with the mortgage-style student loan-books of the 1990s. The Government 
has now announced its intention to sell the more recent income-contingent student loans. 
This could bring a significant financial windfall to the public purse. However, we conclude 
that the BIS Department has yet to prove that it has sufficient evidence to judge whether or 
not selling these assets represents good value for money. We recommend that before any 
sale, the Government demonstrates the costs of the sale, as well as benefits, so that full 
value-for-money may be assessed. 
In the most recent Autumn Statement, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the 
removal of the cap on student numbers. There is agreement that the principle behind the 
removal of the student numbers cap is a worthy aspiration. The Government’s 
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announcement that the cap will be removed appears to be based on a policy to fund the 
cost of this through sales of income-contingent student loans. Given the uncertainty 
around the amount the Government could realise from the sale of income-contingent 
student loans, it is vital that the Government sets out clearly where and how it will raise the 
£5.55 billion required to fund this policy for the next five years.  
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Glossary 
 
AME:   Annual Managed Expenditure 
BIS:   The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
DEL:   Departmental Expenditure Limit 
HEFCE:  Higher Education Funding Council for England 
HEPI:   Higher Education Policy Institute 
HMRC:   Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
NAO:   National Audit Office 
NUS:   National Union of Students 
PAYE:   Pay As You Earn taxation 
RAB charge:  The Resource Accounting and Budgeting charge 
RPI:   Retail Price Index 
SLC:   The Student Loans Company 
The Department: The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills  
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1 Background 
Funding higher education 
1. There is both a social and economic benefit to having an educated population, and 
therefore Governments often subsidise the cost to the student of higher education. In the 
United Kingdom, the UK Government and the devolved administrations do this by paying 
out loans to students with more favourable terms and conditions attached to them than 
commercial loans. 
2. In 1990 the UK Government issued student loans for students across the UK, structured 
so that a graduate paid back a fixed amount each month via direct debit.1 These are 
referred to as ‘mortgage-style’ loans because of the structural similarities to mortgage debt. 
In 1998, the then Government stopped issuing this type of loan and started issuing 
‘income-contingent’ loans in which the amount repaid was related directly to how much 
the graduate earned. In both cases, however, graduates only made repayments once their 
earnings reached a set threshold. The National Audit Office (NAO) reported that between 
1990 and March 2013, the Student Loans Company (SLC) paid out £4 billion of mortgage-
style loans and £51 billion of income-contingent loans.2 
3. Under the current system, universities can charge up to £9,000 in tuition fees per year. 
The Government offers every student a tuition fee loan of up to £9,000 and an additional 
maintenance loan of up to £7,751 (depending on the location of the student and their 
family income) per year of study. The Government also offers a maintenance grant for 
students from lower income families. These grants are not repayable, but a student 
receiving such a grant has a corresponding reduction to their maintenance loan.3 
4. Responsibility for the administration, maintenance and servicing of the student loan-
book is split between three bodies. The Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (the 
Department) has overall responsibility for student loans. The administration of student 
loans is the responsibility of the Student Loans Company (SLC), which pays out 
maintenance loans to students and tuition fee loans to universities on the behalf of 
students. The majority of student loan repayments (around 82 per cent in 2012–13) are 
collected by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), from graduates who are 
employed within the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) taxation system. The remaining amount is 
collected by the SLC from graduates outside of the PAYE system (for example, self-
employed graduates and those working outside of the United Kingdom). 
  
 
1 For a summary of the development of student loans, see Annex A 
2 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 1.5 
3 Government Website, ‘Student Finance’, accessed 16 June 2014 
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Figure 1: Overview of the student loan collection system 
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Student Loans Company information 
The NAO Report on student loan repayments 
5. In November 2013 the National Audit Office (NAO) published a Report into the student 
loans repayment system. The Report focussed on the collection regime of the student loan 
system and came to the following headline conclusions: 
1. BIS should publish a transparent and readily understandable forecast for 
the amount it expects to be collected each year and report on any variance; 
2. BIS does not currently set a collections performance target to incentivise 
the SLC and HMRC to maximise recovery of repayments; 
3. BIS lacks sufficient information on whether borrowers with no current 
employment record are earning enough to repay their loans; and 
4. Around 14,000 borrowers living overseas are currently behind in their loan 
repayments. While this group is small compared to the total number of 
borrowers, the SLC could learn more from other organisations that collect 
debt.4 
The NAO concluded that the Department “urgently needs to understand how the loan 
book is performing and how it will perform, when the value of outstanding loans is 
projected to increase substantially”.5 
 
4 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 19a–19d 
5 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 19 
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2 Part one: Student funding policy, 
strategy and review 
Introduction 
6. It has been estimated that the level of student debt will increase from £46 billion in 2013 
to approximately £330 billion by 2044.6 The student loan-book will therefore become a 
significant macro-economic consideration within a generation. In its recent Report, the 
NAO made four clear recommendations to improve the strategic outlook of the Student 
Loans Company (SLC).7 Our inquiry also raised concerns which caused us to scrutinise the 
role of the SLC. 
Systematic factors 
The RAB charge 
7. Fundamental to the ability of the Government to accurately target, value and redeem 
outstanding loans, is its ability to forecast repayments into the future. The NAO reported 
that “BIS’s projections of annual loan repayments have consistently been higher than 
amounts collected”.8 It went on to conclude that “reliable forecasts of repayments are 
required for a robust valuation of the loan book”.9 
8. The difference between the estimate of the value of future income from students and the 
original value of the loans is recorded as a cost in full in the year that the loans are given. 
This cost is also known as an ‘impairment’ or the ‘Resource Accounting and Budgeting’ 
(RAB) charge and provides early recognition, at a total level, of amounts that are expected 
never to be repaid. In other words, the RAB charge calculates the predicted subsidy that the 
Government implicitly pays to students through the favourable terms connected to student 
loans. The RAB charge is presented as a percentage, which may be interpreted as ‘if the 
Government loaned £1 to a student today, on average what percentage of that £1 does it 
expect not to be repaid?’ 
Forecasting implications of the RAB charge 
9. The Government currently models future repayments by forecasting what proportion of 
loans issued will never be repaid. However, accurate forecasting of the RAB charge has 
been a challenge for the Government. The NAO expressed concern when it reported on 
this and concluded that the Department could not explain the difference between actual 
and forecast repayments: 
 
6 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 3 & HC Deb, 18 June 2014, c657W 
7 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 19 
8 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 15 
9 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 15 
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BIS has faced difficulties in accurately forecasting repayments of these 
complex loans, and in 2009–10 forecasts were nearly 20 per cent higher than 
amounts collected. BIS has since improved its forecasting methods but still 
consistently over-forecasts how much it expects to collect annually by around 
8 per cent.10 
The NAO estimated that this inability to accurately forecast resulted in the Department 
collecting £111 million less in repayments than it expected in 2011–12.11 
10. The President of the National Union of Students, Toni Pearce, voiced the Union’s 
concerns about this, highlighting how much the estimate of the RAB charge had changed 
over the past two years: 
The changing of the estimation from 33 per cent to between 35 per cent and 
40 per cent […] shows the unpredictability and, I suppose, that risk of what 
happens if graduate earnings do not stack up to what you expect them to be.12 
11. The Department was aware that its forecasting had not performed well. It told the 
NAO that it aimed “to improve forecasting by using more detailed information on 
borrowers’ earnings to project future earnings and repayments”.13 Its current modelling 
does not include factors that can affect how quickly a borrower’s salary will rise, such as the 
subject they studied or the university they attended, despite the fact that the data indicates 
that there is a correlation between the factors.14 This weakness in the model has been 
highlighted to the Department for some time. As far back as 2010, the Higher Education 
Policy Institute (HEPI) reported that the Government had significantly under-estimated 
the RAB charge. In October 2012, HEPI published its own analysis, which produced a RAB 
charge of around 40 per cent (12 percentage points higher than the Department's estimate 
at the time). The Secretary of State, in response to that work, strongly refuted HEPI’s 
findings: 
We do not accept that they are right. We are in the world of forecasting, and 
by definition nobody is right about forecasts. We had the HEPI view put to 
us two years ago, when we were thinking of the current changes, so we are 
aware. But they are an outlier in this whole debate.15 
That view was confirmed by Martin Donnelly, Permanent Secretary at BIS: 
It is worth making the point that there is a roughly 10 per cent difference at 
the moment, and these figures do move around. But HEPI argued that 40p of 
every pound loaned would never be repaid, which is very significantly 
 
10 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 15 
11 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 15 
12 Q51 
13 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 16 
14 For example: Business Innovation and Skills Research Paper No 112, The impact of university degrees on the lifecycle 
of earnings (August 2013) 
15 Oral Evidence taken on 30 October 2012, HC (2012–13) 702-I, Q73 
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different from where both we and the IFS are, given that this is not, by 
definition, precise.16 
12. The Government now estimates the RAB charge to be 45 per cent, although at the time 
of our taking evidence it was estimated to be around 40 per cent.17 Bahram Bekhradnia, 
Director of HEPI, outlined the developments in the RAB charge: 
The original Government projection was 28 per cent RAB charge. It then 
went to 30 per cent in the White Paper. It was 32 per cent this time last year, 
[when the Secretary of State gave evidence] and now they are saying 35 per 
cent to 40 per cent. I see London Economics are saying it is close to 40 per 
cent as well. 
It is not that we have produced a different RAB charge; what we did was to 
take the Government’s model and plug in different assumptions to those that 
they had.18 
13. During our inquiry into the Government’s higher education reform in 2011, we drew 
the Minister’s attention to the work of HEPI. The Minister did not accept HEPI’s 
assessment then, stating that “no one can be certain” about the RAB charge.19 When he 
appeared before us in 2014, the Minister conceded that HEPI’s research appeared to be 
more accurate than his own but argued that HEPI had been “right, for the wrong 
reasons”.20 He elaborated: 
It does not follow that the RAB charge’s having got to 40 per cent is because 
the exact calculations that he made then [in 2012] were correct. The big thing 
is earnings. Our forecasts, 30 years out, are incredibly sensitive to a change in 
earnings every six months.21 
14. However, in evidence to us HEPI cited projected earnings as a specific failing of the 
Department’s model: 
The estimates from the BIS model are insensitive to long term growth in 
average wages. This is because the projected earnings of former students and 
the future repayment threshold level are both increased annually in line with 
average earnings. 
[…] 
It seems likely that, even if the career growth in earnings is maintained on 
average, the spread will increase. That is, while top earners may see an even 
 
16 Oral Evidence taken on 30 October 2012, HC (2012–13) 702-I, Q81 [Mr Donnelly] 
17 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Annual report and Accounts 2013–14, HC 39, July 2014, page 88 
18 Q69 
19 Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2010–12, Government reform of Higher 
Education, HC 885, para 72 
20 Q149 
21 Q149 
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bigger growth in earnings over their lifetime, those in the lower range of 
earnings will not see the growth in earnings over their careers that has been 
typical, at least for men, for those in ‘graduate’ jobs in the past. In the USA 
only high earners have seen increases in real earnings over three decades, and 
in the UK increasing dispersion of graduate earnings is now being observed. 
[…] If median and low earners earn less than has been assumed then that will 
reduce the loan repayments, and increase the cost to the Government.22 
15. Bahram Bekhradnia, Director of HEPI, reinforced his organisation’s analytical findings 
on the Department’s modelling of the RAB charge when he gave evidence: 
The biggest reason for [the RAB charge’s] change up to now has been that 
the earnings that graduates have are rather lower than the Government 
assumed, and that makes a big difference between last year and 2016, because 
the repayment threshold is fixed at £21,000. If people are earning less than 
had been assumed, then less money is coming in, and then when the 
repayment threshold starts going up after that, that has a knock-on effect.23 
He concluded that the main reason for HEPI’s greater accuracy was that the Department’s 
assumption that future earnings growth would “be spread equally among the population” 
because “that has never happened in the recent past, and there is no reason to think that it 
will in the future”.24 
16. Toni Pearce, the President of the National Union of Students, highlighted another 
aspect of the Department’s modelling which was open to question: 
One of the fundamental miscalculations about how we measure that future 
risk and the future amount that people will or will not repay is that when 
these were first forecast, they were forecast on the basis that equal numbers of 
men and women would go to university and on the basis that women would 
have lower graduate earnings. However, we know that more women year on 
year go to university and that has had a huge impact on what the forecast of 
the RAB charge is. When you are making such fundamental miscalculations 
at the very beginning, I find it quite concerning.25 
17. The evidence that we have received, both in this inquiry and previous inquiries, 
suggests that there has been a persistent miscalculation of the Department’s estimates of 
the RAB charge. The resulting holes in the budget are only just beginning to materialise. 
Forecasters, particularly HEPI, had and continue to have a more accurate picture of 
repayments. Despite this, the Department has ignored their concerns. We recommend 
that, as a matter of urgency, the Department conducts a full review of all the financial 
assumptions underpinning the Department’s RAB model. 
 
22 Higher Education Policy Institute (SLB 0002) paras 14–15 
23 Q69 
24 Q69 
25 Q51 [Ms Pearce] 
Student Loans 13 
 
Budgetary implications of the RAB charge 
18. Student loans are given on “soft terms”, in that they have more favourable terms and 
conditions attached to them than if students were to borrow the money commercially. 
They are, therefore, effectively subsidised.26 This subsidy arises from two elements: the 
interest rate being lower than the Government’s cost of borrowing capital (for pre-2012 
loans) and ‘policy write-offs’, for example, the fact that all loans are written off after 30 
years. As we mentioned earlier in this Report, the RAB charge provides early recognition, 
at a total level, of amounts that are expected never to be repaid. BIS has been given a ring-
fenced budget within its Resource Departmental Expenditure Limit (Resource DEL) for 
these impairments each year, which has been set by the Treasury, based on a target level of 
impairments.27 The target level of impairments is not currently published. If the 
assumptions made in the BIS student loan repayment model (the RAB charge) are revised, 
there can be further impairments of historic loans in following years. For example, in 
2013–14, the Department received £6.7bn from HM Treasury to allow for additional 
impairments of new and existing student loans, of which £3.4bn was utilised.28 The 
Treasury has therefore been keen to provide BIS with some incentives to take measures to 
keep these costs under control over the medium and longer term, rather than simply look 
to Treasury to make up the shortfall. 
19. As a result, impairments to post-2012 student loans above HM Treasury’s target are 
now charged to DEL over 30 years, spreading these costs to budgets that BIS must manage 
itself. The Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Danny Alexander, stated that this would 
“improve the incentives for managing the long-term costs of new student loans”.29 If BIS 
then fails to take action to revise its policies around student loans, there is a risk that 
impairments of the student loan book will adversely impact other, unrelated BIS budgets. 
20. Annex B sets out how student loans are accounted for, and where responsibility for risk 
lies. Adjustments made to previously issued loans, to ensure the carrying value of these 
loans is not greater than the value of estimated future cash flows, is known as the stock 
charge.30 The level of actual loans and repayments every year is recorded in the Annual 
Managed Expenditure (AME), where the budgets are not subject to a fixed annual limit 
and therefore the risk lies primarily with Treasury rather than the Department. The level of 
actual repayments only affects the Department’s DEL budget in so far as it alters 
projections for future repayments over the long term. 
21. We support the Chief Secretary to the Treasury’s ambition of improving the 
incentives for managing the long term costs of new student loans, and encourage the 
Treasury to look for further ways to strengthen these incentives. However, we are 
 
26 HM Treasury, Consolidated Budgeting Guidance from 2014-15 (February 2014), para 8.9 
27 HM Treasury, Consolidated Budgeting Guidance from 2014-15 (February 2014), para 8.14 
28 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Annual report and Accounts 2013–14, HC 39, July 2014, page 88 
29 Correspondence between HM Treasury and Sir Alan Beith, 15 January 2014 
30 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Annual report and Accounts 2013–14, HC 39, July 2014, page 88 
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concerned that the current arrangements may have an adverse impact on unrelated BIS 
budgets in the medium term. 
22. In order to improve transparency and accountability, we recommend that the 
Department publishes HM Treasury’s targets for impairments for student loans alongside 
reports against actual performance. 
Monitoring and reporting of the Student Loans Company against targets 
23. The organisations and agencies responsible for student loans are subject to a series of 
targets set by the Department. The NAO’s Report stated that the Department set: 
Adequate targets for HMRC designed to incentivise quick and accurate 
information processing and repayment collection through the tax system, 
and HMRC met all of these targets in 2012–13. These targets have become 
tougher since 2010–11, and HMRC has consistently met them.31 
24. In respect of the Student Loans Company, the NAO found that: 
In 2012–13, the SLC met three out of four targets for the percentage of 
borrowers in a repayment channel. […] In 2010–11 and 2011–12, the SLC 
met all income-contingent repayment collection targets.32 
However, the NAO concluded that, although the SLC may have met its targets, they were 
not fit for purpose. It is a key target for the SLC to have 98.5 per cent of borrowers in a 
Repayment Channel, which the Department describes as any borrower that it considers to 
be “either repaying on time or not earning enough to repay”.33 The NAO found that the 
SLC was counting a substantial number of borrowers as being in a Repayment Channel 
despite not having current information on either their employment status or whether or 
not they should be repaying. The NAO pointed out that, as a result, a large number of 
borrowers may have been incorrectly categorised: 
While the SLC met most of the targets that BIS set in 2012–13 for income-
contingent repayment loans, performance against targets does not present a 
complete picture of repayment performance. At March 2013, BIS and the 
SLC had recorded 36,400 borrowers as not in a repayment channel due to a 
lack of earnings information. However, a further 368,000 borrowers also had 
no current UK employment record (but had paid tax in the past), and had 
not yet provided other earnings information that would allow the SLC and 
HMRC to establish whether they were earning enough to repay.34 
25. The NAO estimated that, had the SLC classified graduates that it had no current 
employment information on as being outside of a Repayment Channel, its performance 
 
31 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 2.4 
32 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 2.3 
33 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 7 
34 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 2.6 
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against such targets would be reduced from 99.1 per cent to 86.4 per cent in 2013, clearly 
missing its target. If fully repaid or cancelled accounts were also removed from the 
Repayment Channel that figure would fall to 84 per cent. 
Table 1: Design of collection performance targets 
 
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Student Loans Company data 
The NAO concluded that “the way BIS has designed the targets means that reported 
performance is potentially misleading”.35 
26. For the NAO to conclude that the targets set for the Student Loans Company by the 
Department may have been misleading is a damning finding. It is obvious to us that the 
Department must address this as a matter of urgency. 
Targeting repayments 
27. The NAO recommended that a more accurate target for the SLC would be the amount 
of repayment money collected in a year. This would provide greater clarity, and assist in 
the performance measurement of the SLC. However, such a target would be subject to 
factors outside of the control of the SLC. For example, borrowers do not make any 
repayments until they earn an income above a specified amount (currently £21,000 a year). 
This means that the SLC is dependent on positive macro-economic conditions 
(specifically, higher employment) to increase repayment amounts. If unemployment rose, 
repayments would fall. The NAO summarised this concern: 
We recognise that the amounts collected may, in part, differ from forecast 
due to fluctuations in the economic climate and therefore be beyond BIS’s 
direct control.36 
28. However, the NAO was clear that “BIS should publish a transparent and readily 
understandable forecast for the amount it expects to be collected each year and report on 
any variance”.37 When he came before us, David Willetts, the Minister for Universities and 
 
35 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 2.8 
36 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 19a 
37 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 19a 
Repayment status As reported
by SLC
If no employment
record treated as
not in repayment
Also removing fully
repaid or cancelled
accounts
UK resident borrowers in a
repayment channel
UK resident borrowers not
in a repayment channel
Proportion of borrowers
in a repayment channel
2,875,259 2,507,225 2,069,643
27,124 395,158 395,158
99.1% 86.4% 84.0%
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Science, told us that he had accepted the NAO’s recommendations.38 However, it was not 
clear to us whether this specific recommendation would be implemented in the near 
future: 
If graduate repayments are lower because average earnings are lower than 
forecast, that is different from graduate repayments being lower because the 
Student Loans Company fails to pursue people efficiently. We have to 
disentangle those different effects.39 
29. We already have noted that this is a factor in the setting of a financial target, but we 
believe that the NAO was correct to state that: 
It is important for BIS to explain to what degree it is able to track and 
account for such variances and demonstrate that it has a good understanding 
of how the loans are operating.40 
30. The NAO has highlighted under-performance in terms of the collection of loans and 
the need for an annual target of money collected in a year together with an explanation of 
any variance. We support that recommendation and look to the Department to set clear 
targets for the SLC as a matter of urgency and to publish the earnings and collection 
assumptions behind those targets. 
Cultural factors 
31. In February 2014, the Committee of Public Accounts reported that: 
The approach to collecting debt lacks rigour. The Department and the 
Student Loans Company need to improve the collection of loan repayments. 
[…] The Student Loans Company have not put sufficient energy into 
identifying those borrowers who have slipped out of contact but should be 
making repayments. The Department needs a better understanding of 
performance gaps and how it could address them.41 
32. We received similar evidence during the course of our inquiry. For example, the 
President of the National Union of Students expressed her concern that the taxpayer was 
losing out because the SLC was not collecting debts effectively: 
I am a taxpayer and I am interested in making sure that that money is 
recouped, partly because I am interested in the finances of the country and I 
am interested in our economic situation.42 
She concluded:  
38 Q136 
39 Q136 
40 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 19a 
41 Committee of Public Accounts, Forty-Fourth Report of Session 2013–14, Student Loan repayments, HC 886, 
recommendation 4 
42 Q6 
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There is an overriding responsibility to collect that money back. There is an 
overriding responsibility to give taxpayers value for money in terms of these 
assets, and I do not think, personally, that that is what has happened.43 
Graduates now living overseas 
33. According to the NAO’s analysis of the SLC’s data, two per cent of borrowers with 
outstanding student loans are currently working overseas. While this is a very small 
percentage, it represents an outstanding debt of £400 million.44 Approximately 25 per cent 
of that debt is in arrears: around 14,000 graduates living overseas are currently behind on 
their repayments.45 
34. The NUS argued that the current systems used by the SLC made it hard for borrowers 
living overseas to repay debts and arrears: 
At present, any repayments due are based on the borrower’s earnings, with 
the repayment threshold adjusted for cost of living (a lower cost of living 
means a lower threshold, with the opposite also being true). The borrower 
must then convert the payments into sterling and make them via bank 
transfer often at additional expense. We believe this could be made easier if 
the SLC could open bank accounts in some of the countries where larger 
numbers of borrowers reside, or utilise services such as PayPal.46 
35. When we asked the Minister how the Department would improve its collection of 
debts abroad, he appeared to focus on the same areas of difficulty. He confirmed that the 
Department was working to improve the procedures to make it easier for graduates to 
repay: 
We are improving online statements so they can see where they stand. We 
are trying to make it easier for overseas borrowers to repay through the 
introduction of PayPal or other electronic overseas repayment methods.47 
36. While these initiatives are all positive developments, the large amount of outstanding 
debt from graduates working overseas does not stem from the fact that graduates don’t 
know how to pay, but rather that they are avoiding making payments. The NUS 
acknowledged this problem: 
Partly through wishful thinking, and partly due to urban myth, borrowers 
may believe that repayment is not required if you move overseas. None of 
this is true.48 
 
43 Q8 
44 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), figure 11 
45 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 3.14 
46 National Union of Students (SLB 0006) extract 
47 Q139 
48 National Union of Students (SLB 0006) extract 
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37. HEPI compared the English and Australian student loans systems and suggested that 
both countries consider: 
• converting income-contingent debt to mortgage-style debt on leaving the country; 
• applying a higher rate of interest or a surcharge on all those going abroad to work 
for a period of time; and 
• taking a joined-up approach with other parts of Government so that non-
repayment affects other services.49 
38. Mick Laverty, the Chief Executive of the SLC, explained to the Committee of Public 
Accounts how the SLC chased students who had moved abroad and did not pay: 
We would start off by contacting these people and, if they do not respond, 
tracing them to make sure we have their correct address. If that does not 
work, we use various trace techniques to contact the family and friends 
whom they put on their application when they first apply.50 
He also said that, in some cases, the SLC would use private debt collectors.51 
39. However, Mr Laverty acknowledged that communications from the SLC were easy to 
ignore and, with all loans written off after 30 years, there was little incentive for debts to be 
paid when they were easy to avoid.52 Despite this, the Minister assured us that the 
Department was striving to incentivise debtors to begin paying again: 
We are also creating much stronger incentives for them to repay by 
communicating to them that, if their repayments pause—if we have asked 
them for information and they are not providing it—they are racking up 
interest at RPI plus 3 per cent.53 
40. This appears to go hand in hand with a recent media campaign apparently aimed at 
such graduates to dissuade avoiding repayments while working abroad.54 While it was clear 
that the Minister had good intentions to improve this situation, our findings suggest that 
more needed to be done. We have heard that in New Zealand, although student loans are 
usually income contingent, when borrowers move overseas they pay a flat rate based on the 
 
49 Higher Education Policy Institute, A comparison of student loans in England and Australia (April 2014), para 82 
50 Oral evidence taken before the Committee of Public Accounts on 11 December 2013, HC (2012–13) 886, Q162 
51 Oral evidence taken before the Committee of Public Accounts on 11 December 2013, HC (2012–13) 886, Q162 
52 Student Loans Company, ‘Loan Cancellation’, accessed 13 June 2014 
53 Q139 
54 For example: 
“Government promises to pursue British graduates living abroad who default on their student loan payments”, The 
Independent, 14 January 2014 
“EU graduates 'cannot evade' loan repayments”, BBC News, 12 May 2013 
“Student loan 'could land you in court' if you move overseas”, The Telegraph, 24 May 2012 
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total outstanding loan.55 This removes the need for the Government to collect information 
of the borrower’s income and makes the borrower’s obligations clear. 
41. The Government is finding it harder to collect from debtors who have moved abroad 
and the complicated structure of income-contingent loans adds to that difficulty. We 
therefore recommend that the Government assesses whether converting income-
contingent debt to mortgage-style debt for borrowers leaving the country would aid 
collection of outstanding student loans. 
Absence of information 
42. A common thread in our inquiry and that of the Committee of Public Accounts was 
the lack of a solid evidence base on the data underlying the student loan-book. Specifically, 
the NAO reported that the Department lacked “sufficient information on whether 
borrowers with no current employment record are earning enough to repay their loans”.56 
The NAO made three recommendations to the Department: 
1. Carry out analysis to better understand the circumstances of borrowers in 
this category, particularly those who remain without a UK employment 
record for longer periods, and to assess the level of repayments that may be 
lost. 
2. Work with other government Departments to develop a strategy for 
sharing data that provides opportunities to gain information on the 
circumstances of specific borrowers, for example those who have not had an 
employment record for long periods. Given the projected size of this public 
asset, other departments should consider how they can support BIS and the 
SLC. 
3. Target borrowers where there is a greater risk that they could be avoiding 
repayment. For example, those whose degree subjects or universities indicate 
they are more likely to be earning above the threshold or pursuing careers 
overseas.57 
43. Our inquiry also considered this matter. The Director of HEPI, Bahram Bekhradnia, 
had some sympathy for the size of the Department’s task, but told us that more could be 
done with additional resources: 
I suspect that a lot of them [the individuals] are avoiding it. I am sure the 
Government are doing what they can; they can devote more resource to 
chasing them. It is an issue.58 
 
55 Inland Revenue New Zealand, ‘Repayment obligations for overseas-based borrowers’, accessed 19 June 2014  
56 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 12 
57 National Audit Office, Student loan repayments (November 2013), para 19c 
58 Q65 
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44. The lack of detailed information was also highlighted when Martin Donnelly, 
Permanent Secretary in the Department, Luke Edwards, Deputy Director of HMRC, and 
Mick Laverty, Chief Executive of the SLC, gave evidence to the Committee of Public 
Accounts. When questioned, they were unable to give detailed information on: 
• How many people were currently making repayments59 
• Whether or not information about fraud was shared with other departments60 
• How much money was owed by British students abroad61 
• How much was owed by EU-students62 
• The names of people who owed money who are abroad63 
• The country where the biggest outstanding debt was.64 
45. The Committee of Public Accounts concluded that: 
The Department and the Student Loans Company have not put sufficient 
energy into identifying those borrowers who have slipped out of contact but 
should be making repayments. The Department needs a better 
understanding of performance gaps and how it could address them.65 
When he gave evidence to us, however, the Minister tried to reassure us that the 
Department would improve this “by collecting information promptly, keeping in touch 
with people who have borrowed, and being energetic in reclaiming it”.66 
46. It is clear from our evidence and that of the Committee of Public Accounts that the 
overall approach to collecting student debt lacks rigour. It is the case that the SLC is 
required to meet targets set by the Department and it is true that the SLC has met most 
of these targets. However, we conclude that the SLC’s targets are not fit for purpose and 
need urgent review. 
Other factors 
International comparisons 
47. The box below compares features of the English student loan repayment system with 
those of Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America.  
59 Oral evidence taken before the Committee of Public Accounts on 11 December 2013, HC (2012–13) 886, Q149 
60 Oral evidence taken before the Committee of Public Accounts on 11 December 2013, HC (2012–13) 886, Q157 
61 Oral evidence taken before the Committee of Public Accounts on 11 December 2013, HC (2012–13) 886, Q161 
62 Oral evidence taken before the Committee of Public Accounts on 11 December 2013, HC (2012–13) 886, Q172 
63 Oral evidence taken before the Committee of Public Accounts on 11 December 2013, HC (2012–13) 886, Q170 
64 Oral evidence taken before the Committee of Public Accounts on 11 December 2013, HC (2012–13) 886, Q179 
65 Committee of Public Accounts, Forty-Fourth Report of Session 2013–14, Student Loan repayments, HC 886, 
conclusion 4 
66 Q154 
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Table 2: Comparison of similar student-loan collection regimes 
 
Source: Business, Innovation and Skills Committee analysis of NAO Student Loans Report and U.S. Student Loans 
website 
48. The U.S. Department of Education uses loan servicer companies to collect student loan 
payments, respond to customer service inquiries and perform other administrative tasks.67 
There are 11 such companies currently administering the Direct Loan Program and the 
Federal Family Education Loan Program.68 The Department monitors survey results and 
dozens of financial metrics, including default rates, for all loan servicing contractors.69 
These are used to assess the servicers’ performance and determine the proportion of loans 
to allocate to each servicer.70 The servicers have performance-based contracts so that they 
compete against each other for a share of the allocation of new borrowers to service. 
Greater performance results in a larger allocation of new borrowers and therefore more 
income from the Department of Education. 
49. The U.S. Department of Education also contracts with 23 collection companies to try 
and recover defaulted loans. The allocation of defaulted loans again depends on the 
collectors’ performance. However, there has been some criticism that “the Department has 
 
67 Federal Student Aid (An Office of the U.S. Department of Education), ‘Repay your loans’, accessed 19 June 2014 
68 Federal Student Aid (An Office of the U.S. Department of Education), ‘Loan Servicers’, accessed 19 June 2014 
69 Federal Student Aid (An Office of the U.S. Department of Education), Annual Report 2013 (December 2013), page 37 
70 Fedloan Servicing, ‘School FAQ’, accessed 19 June 2014
England Australia New Zealand U.S.
Repayments 
based on 
Earnings  Earnings                                        Earnings  Choice of
repayment
plans—fixed or
earnings
 
Repayment
term
 Thirty years,
then remainder
written off 
 
Not written off
until death or
bankruptcy 
 
Not written off
until death or
bankruptcy
Usually 10 years,
income
contingent loans
written off after
25 years
Repayments:
borrowers in
country
 
Collected through
tax system  
Collected through
tax system
 
 
Repaid to loan
servicers  
Repayments:
borrowers
overseas 
 
Repaid directly to
Student Loan
Company
 
None owed None owed for
first three years,
then repaid
directly to Inland
Revenue
Department (IRD) 
 
Repaid to loan
servicers  
Interest rate
 
Based on inflation
and borrower
earnings
Based on inflation
 
None while living
in New Zealand,
set annually by
IRD for overseas
borrowers 
Fixed for the life
of the loan 
 
Collected through
tax system 
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created financial incentives for its contractors that encourage high collections at the 
expense of borrower rights”.71 
50. It is regrettable that the Government did not do more to learn from examples of best 
practice overseas. The Government should examine examples of good practice overseas, 
including in the United States of America, in order to assess whether elements could be 
incorporated into the working culture of the SLC. 
Removing the cap on the numbers of students 
51. The issues that we have highlighted in this section could be addressed satisfactorily in a 
contained environment, as is currently the case. The Higher Education Funding Council 
for England (HEFCE) explained: 
When universities and colleges recruit new students, they cannot simply take 
as many as they might like. This is because the Government needs to control 
the level of publicly-funded student loans and grants for fees and 
maintenance.72 
52. It may be sensible to control Government spend on students, especially when the 
Minister said that the Government “estimate[s] that around 60 per cent of students 
supported under the post-2012 funding system will benefit from having some or all of their 
loan written off”.73 However, that control on spending is due to be abolished. In 2014–15, 
the number of HEFCE fundable places for students will be 264,363. Students who achieve 
ABB grades at A-level (or equivalent in certain other qualifications) are not included in 
that number control and it is assumed that approximately 119,000 students will achieve 
these grades and will be exempt from the student number controls.74 In the 2013 Autumn 
Statement, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the Government would 
remove the cap on student numbers at publicly-funded higher education institutions in 
England in 2015–16.75 He described the cap—designed to control the level of public-
funding on student loans—as “arbitrary”.76 
53. There is general support across the political spectrum for the educational, economic 
and social benefits of removing the cap on the number of students. Indeed, as the 
Chancellor stated, “each year, about 60,000 young people who have worked hard at school, 
got the results, want to go on learning and want to take out a loan to pay for it are 
prevented from doing so”.77 However, there is a cost attached to the removal of the cap. 
 
71 Ryder Law firm, ‘Student Loan Collections Under Fire’, accessed 19 June 2014  
72 Higher Education Funding Council for England, ‘Student numbers and high grades’, accessed 13 June 2013 
73 “Six in 10 students will have their debts written off”, The Telegraph, 5 April 2014  
74 Correspondence between the Higher Education Funding Council for England and the Secretariat for the Business 
Innovation and Skills Committee, 9 June 2014 
75 HM Treasury, Autumn Statement 2013, Cm 8747, December 2013, para 1.194 
76 HC Deb, 5 December 2013, col 1110 
77 HC Deb, 5 December 2013, col 1110 
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The Government subsidises students and therefore the removal of the cap eliminates any 
control over the level of subsidy. 
54. The arrangements for the efficient collection of the student loan scheme are not 
working and the current system of ‘debt’ and ‘repayment’ is not being managed 
effectively. It is clear that an overhaul of the system is needed, especially in light of the 
Minister’s assessment that the level of student debt will increase to approximately £330 
billion by 2044. 
55. The Student Loans Company should be fair but robust in fulfilling its duty to achieve 
value for money and must demonstrate a strategic shift to a more dynamic culture in its 
duties to achieve the best value for the taxpayer through the most efficient collection of 
repayments. The Department should assist with this by realigning the formal targets to 
demonstrate this expectation and drive through a change of culture. 
56. The United Kingdom is approaching a tipping point for the financial viability of the 
student loans system and the removal of the cap on student numbers will put even greater 
pressure on the system. There is a need for an urgent review of the sustainability of the 
system. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government must come 
back with a clear timescale for this review.  
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3 Part two: Sales, announcements and 
budgets 
Historical sale of the mortgage-style loan-book 
Background 
57. The Government categorises the student loan-book as an asset and, as such, is able to 
sell that asset to raise money. The Government sold part of the loan-book previously in 
1998 and 1999. In November 2013, the Government announced that it had successfully 
sold the last of mortgage-style student loans with a book-value of £890 million to a private 
buyer for £160 million: 
The Government has announced the sale of outstanding student loans owed 
by around a quarter of a million borrowers for £160 million. The sale relates 
to the remaining 17 per cent of mortgage-style loans taken out by students 
who began courses between 1990 and 1998. 
Erudio Student Loans was selected as the successful bidder through a 
competitive process. Its offer was judged to represent the best value for 
money for the tax payer and the price paid exceeds the estimated value to the 
Government of retaining the loans.78 
At the time of the sale, the Minister stated that the primary objective was to bring in money 
for the Government, although he also acknowledged that the private sector may also be 
better placed to collect the loans: 
The sale of the remaining mortgage style student loan book represents good 
value for money, helping to reduce public sector net debt by £160 million. 
The private sector is well placed to maximise returns from the book which 
has a deteriorating value.79 
58. The notional value of the loan-book was £890 million. The Minister told us that selling 
the loan-book at a £730 million discount represented value for money because the headline 
figure did not signify its true value: 
In reality, most of these mortgage loans were not in repayment, or people 
who had the debt were below the earnings threshold. We were always very 
realistic that this last tranche of residuals were the least-well-performing 
mortgage loans and their actual commercial value would be significantly 
below their face value.80 
 
78 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills & The Shareholder Executive press release, Sale of mortgage style 
student loan book completed, 25 November 2013 
79 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills & The Shareholder Executive press release, Sale of mortgage style 
student loan book completed, 25 November 2013 
80 Q95 
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59. Dr McGettigan, an independent academic commentator, was concerned that, despite 
the lower level of true value, the Government had sold future income streams at a discount 
to fund short-term dividends. The 1998 and 1999 sales passed a combined £2 billion of 
loans to the private sector.81 Commenting on those sales, Dr McGettigan argued that the 
Government subsidised that purchase “in order to get in £2 billion of cash up front, 
effectively £3 billion in today’s prices”.82 To facilitate this the Government was “prepared to 
lose £250 million over the long run”.83 
60. He told us that this was also the case in the 2013 sale and the Government had, again, 
sold a steady income stream of repayments in return for an immediate windfall. The 
amount that the Government would have received, however, depended on the different 
assessments about how much of the £890 million would ever be repaid. 
61. Dr McGettigan believed that the Government’s short-term ambitions had driven the 
sale, despite the fact that value for money would be judged in the long term: 
It is just about what the short-term benefits are. Everything we are being 
presented with from the Treasury is the short term benefit: how does this 
change the net cash position in the short term? How does this change the 
public sector net debt in the short term? What does this mean for the 
short-term unsustainable expansion of higher education numbers?84 
62. When commenting on the 2013 sale, the Minister told us that “everybody came away 
with a good deal, and we certainly got value for money for the taxpayer”.85 This raised the 
question of how a private company is able to realise additional value from these hard-to-
recover loans and make a profit. We asked the Minister why the Government could not 
have done the same. He told us that this was because of the greater expertise found in the 
private sector: 
The companies that specialise in underperforming loans, already have an 
infrastructure in place and know how to handle them, they may be able to 
put in time, effort and expertise that the Student Loans Company does not 
possess and do a better job than the Student Loans Company could have 
done.86 
63. The Minister went on to tell us that the secondary benefit to the Government was that 
this enabled it to realise the vision for the SLC to focus solely on issuing and administering 
repayments for the income-contingent loans: 
 
81 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills & The Shareholder Executive press release, Sale of mortgage style 
student loan book completed, 25 November 2013 
82 Q15 
83 Q15 
84 Q16 
85 Q95 
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We want the Student Loans Company to focus on its core task, which is 
delivering a high-quality service to students when they apply for loans, and 
administering the big asset: ensuring repayment of the income-contingent 
loans. It was never going to be a priority use of staff or resource for the 
Student Loans Company to chase the last remaining underperforming 
mortgage loans.87 
64. It is clear that the private sector can see a profit in collecting student loan debts that 
the Government cannot. These findings reinforce our previous conclusions on the 
performance of the SLC’s debt collection. It also lends weight to the Minister’s 
ambition for the Student Loans Company to be removed from this aspect of the student 
loan system for mortgage-style loans which may be extended to the income-contingent 
loans. 
65. We recommend that the Department outlines what rate of repayment it was achieving 
on the £890 million of mortgage-style loans which have now been sold. This may then be 
used as a benchmark to consider the future sales of income-contingent loans. We further 
recommend that the Minister sets out the minimum level of performance he expects of the 
SLC in pursuing the income-contingent loans before he would consider moving all debt 
collection to the private sector. 
Terms and conditions 
66. The National Unions of Students (NUS) believed that selling the student loans broke 
the deal between Government and Students: 
The really important thing here is the way that people feel about where they 
borrow money from and who they owe money to. Particularly the compact 
that individuals, and students particularly, feel that they have with the state 
when it comes to higher education funding is really important.88 
However, of more importance to the NUS was the fact that the terms and conditions of 
loans would be changed by the private sector owners. Its concerns were based on the fact 
that “the terms and conditions for this set of student loans are not fixed at the time that you 
take your loan out”.89 The NUS went on to state that “the fundamental terms and 
conditions could be changed by the Secretary of State without any parliamentary process 
and without scrutiny”.90 The wording attached to the loans confirmed this: 
When you take out a loan, you’ll sign a declaration form which will be a 
contract. This states that you’ve read and understood the terms and 
conditions. You must agree to repay your loan in line with the regulations 
 
87 Q96 
88 Q2 
89 Q42 
90 Q42 
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that apply at the time the repayments are due and as they’re amended. The 
regulations may be replaced by later regulations.91 
67. We asked the Minister why he had reserved the right to change the terms and 
conditions of student loans. He told us that “successive Governments have always had the 
power to change the loans”,92 but offered the reassurance that the selling of the loan book 
actually made it more unlikely that the terms would change, because they were essentially 
locked into the terms of the sale: 
If anything, it makes it very unlikely they would ever be changed, because at 
that point you have written a contract with the private purchaser on the basis 
of setting out the terms of the loan.93 
68. The Minister addressed the concerns of the NUS by saying that “the best thing they 
should look for is the sale of any loans, because it is pretty likely that the contracts written 
at the time of the sale of the loans will specify the terms”.94 It should also be noted that the 
press release announcing the 2013 sale clearly stated that “borrowers will remain protected 
and there will be no change to their terms and conditions, including the calculation of 
interest rates for loans”.95 
69. The Minister has been clear in his public statements that the Department would not 
change any of the terms and conditions attached to the loans as a result of any sale. While 
it is the case that Ministers will retain the power to change the terms and conditions, this 
is not a new provision. We recommend that there should be no change in the terms and 
conditions of existing student loans without parliamentary approval. 
Proposed sale of the income-contingent loan-book 
70. Following the 2013 sale of the remaining mortgage-style loans, the Government 
announced its intention to sell a large number of the newer, income-contingent loans: 
The Government has now identified further assets with the potential for sale 
and the target for the sale of corporate and financial assets will be increased 
from £10 billion to £20 billion between 2014 and 2020.96 
71. The Government expects to raise £12 billion over the next 5 years by selling tranches of 
the income-contingent loan-book.97 However, we heard evidence that the Government 
may struggle to find the necessary demand for these loans in the private sector. Dr 
McGettigan, an independent academic commentator, believed that no private investor  
91 Student Finance England, Student Loans—A guide to terms and conditions 2013–14, section 3 
92 Q121 
93 Q121 
94 Q122 
95 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills & The Shareholder Executive press release, Sale of mortgage style 
student loan book completed, 25 November 2013 
96 HM Treasury, Autumn Statement 2013, Cm 8747, December 2013, para 1.92 
97 HM Treasury, Autumn Statement 2013, Cm 8747, December 2013, table 2.5 
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would buy the debt, without specific assurances from the Government on the interest rate 
connected to those loans. This stems from the fact that the interest paid on student loans is 
the lower of two benchmarks, either: 
1) ‘Bank Rate + one percentage point’ (currently 0.5+1=1.5 per cent); or 
2) ‘Retail Price Index’ measure of inflation (currently 2.6 per cent)98 
Dr McGettigan explained that this meant the amount of interest that students had been 
paying recently was below the Retail Price Index (RPI) and that no private investor would 
ever buy an asset that paid a dividend lower than inflation.99 Dr McGettigan believed that 
the Government would need to introduce a ‘synthetic hedge’ into the deal for it to be 
attractive to investors. A ‘synthetic hedge’ would mean that the Government would enter 
into a contract to pay the difference between what the investor received in interest on the 
loans and the level of inflation. Dr McGettigan explained that: 
The loans would be sold with the interest rate cap in place, but the 
Government would compensate purchasers by entering into a contractual 
obligation to make additional payments after the sale to cover the differential 
between the cash flow actually received for the relevant cohort and the 
estimated cash flows that would have been received had the Base Rate cap 
been removed at the time of sale.100 
72. The Government’s advisors on this sale, Rothschild, agreed. When they reported to the 
Government in 2011, the investment bank outlined two options for the sale, with a ‘cap’ on 
interest rates or without a ‘cap’: 
If the Base Rate101 + 1 per cent cap is removed, investors seemed comfortable 
that substantial demand exists, and at a reasonable price. 
[…] 
However, the Base Rate + 1 per cent cap cuts demand dramatically, both for 
retail and institutional investors. With the cap in place early indications 
suggested that demand may be £1bn–£2bn (over a programme of issues of 
12–18 months) and with a commensurate increase in pricing relative to the 
uncapped option.102 
73. The latter estimate is far lower than the Government’s ambition to raise £12 billion in 
tranches of loans. In order to counter this, the Department confirmed that it was looking 
into the feasibility of a ‘synthetic hedge’ to transfer inflation risk from private investors to 
the Government in an attempt to bolster demand for the debt. The Minister told us that 
 
98 Office for National Statistics, ‘Consumer Price Inflation, June 2014’, accessed 15 July 2014  
99 Andrew McGettigan (SLB 0001) extract 
100 Andrew McGettigan (SLB 0001) extract 
101 Also known as the Bank Rate 
102 Rothschild, Report to the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (2011), extract 
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this was “exactly what our advisers are looking at”.103 Michael Harrison, the Executive 
Director of the Shareholder Executive, elaborated that the terms would vary with each 
tranche of sales: 
We cannot possibly sell all of the [income-contingent] loans, which have a 
face value of £45 billion, in one go, so we need to think about how the sales 
will be segmented—that is, in terms of a multi-stage sale process, which loans 
are sold and when, and what markets we target. Those are the things we are 
principally going through at the moment, together with the commercial 
preparatory work that we need to do for a very large sale.104 
74. When we asked the Shareholder Executive to comment on Rothschild’s findings, its 
Executive Director told us that the research was now out-of-date but assured us that new 
work was underway: 
The Rothschild report was in November 2011 and that formed the basis of 
the feasibility work, which took us into this new phase.105 
The Shareholder Executive wrote to us and confirmed that: 
The Rothschild report was part of a feasibility study to establish proof of 
concept and feasibility for the sale 3 years ago, and to put forward an outline 
business case. The Government has now stated its intention to realise value 
for the taxpayer through a sale, and we have now moved to the sale 
preparation phase—this includes looking at options for structure of the sale 
and routes to market. The Shareholder Executive is revisiting all those 
assumptions with its new advisers, Barclays, in conjunction with Rothschild, 
to make sure it does get the right structure for the current market conditions, 
which have moved on quite a lot from three years ago. Indications three years 
ago was that investors would be more interested in an asset that yielded 
certain RPI-linked returns, rather than uncertain ones (due to the base rate 
cap). Market conditions are more favourable, and we therefore need to 
consider the structure of the sale in light of these. No decision has been taken 
yet.106 
75. The current position, is respect of future sales, raises two significant concerns. First, 
that the Government will discount the sale in order to enjoy an immediate windfall, in 
much the same way as it did with the mortgage-style loans. This may be economically 
acceptable but needs to be based on an accurate judgement on the comparative value of a 
steady income stream against an immediate dividend. Second, that the Government will 
guarantee to a private investor that if the interest received on student loans fell below 
inflation, it would pay the difference. This would introduce a condition to the sale that 
 
103 Q130 
104 Q130 [Mr Harrison] 
105 Q129 [Mr Harrison] 
106 Correspondence between the Shareholder Executive and Business, Innovation and Skills Committee secretariat, 16 
June 2014 
30 Student Loans 
 
commits it, and any future Government to pay an unquantified amount of interest. The 
amount may be negligible but it could be substantial. It is crucial that the Government’s 
analysis covers both of these points comprehensively so that it knows what the cost of the 
sale is to the taxpayer, as well as the dividend. 
76. The Committee of Public Accounts sought reassurance from the Permanent Secretary 
for the Department that the sale of income-contingent loans would not go ahead until 
these issues were resolved. He was clear that “if buyers are not prepared to pay a price 
which is value for money for the taxpayer, the sale will not take place”.107 The Minister 
agreed: 
If there came a point when people said either that the market is saturated 
with these, or people do not want to buy them anymore and so it is bad value 
for money, at that point the Government would not go ahead.108 
77. Despite this, we remain concerned that the assumption from the Government is that 
the sale will go ahead. We were drawn to the 2013 Autumn Statement when the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer appeared to be in no doubt that the sales would go ahead: 
The book will be disposed of in a number of tranches, with a first sale 
intended to occur by the end of financial year 2015–16. Over a 5 year period, 
the sale is expected to generate between £10 billion and £15 billion in sale 
revenues, with a central estimate of around £12 billion.109 
78. The Government appears to have committed itself to the sale of the income 
contingent loans before it has fully assessed the financial viability of such a move. 
Demand for these assets is untested and without the introduction of a synthetic hedge 
would only realise around £2 billion of the £12 billion return expected by Government. 
While demand would increase with the introduction of a synthetic hedge, this would 
come with an additional long-term cost to Government, which has yet to be quantified. 
79. The Government has told us that it has moved to the sale preparation stage with more 
up-to-date analysis underway. This analysis must produce a succinct but penetrative 
assessment of the market and we recommend that it be done as a matter of urgency. 
Without such an analysis, there is no guarantee that the Government will make any of 
the financial returns that it claims. We further recommend that if the Government 
proposes to introduce a ‘synthetic hedge’ or similar it must share its scenario testing and 
specifically publish its estimate of the best-case and worst-case costing scenarios for this 
policy. 
 
107 Oral evidence taken before the Committee of Public Accounts on 11 December 2013, HC (2012–13) 886, Q77 
108 Q126 [Mr Willetts] 
109 HM Treasury, Autumn Statement 2013, Cm 8747, December 2013, para 1.92 
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Linking the student-loans to the removal of the cap on student numbers 
80. In his Autumn Statement, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the 
removal of the student numbers cap would be financed by the sale of income-contingent 
student loans: 
The Government expects the extra cost of student grants and teaching grant 
to be around £720 million a year in 2018–19. The 2010 higher education 
reforms mean that students only pay back the full amount of their loan if 
their lifetime earnings are high enough. This means that there is an implicit 
subsidy in the loans. Based on current assumptions the government estimates 
that the cost of the extra implied subsidy in the medium term will be around 
£700 million a year. This expansion is affordable within a reducing level of 
public sector net borrowing as a result of the reforms to higher education 
finance the Government has enacted. The additional outlay of loans over the 
forecast period will be more than financed by proceeds from the sale of the 
pre-reform income-contingent student loan book.110 
This was summarised in the Autumn Statement supporting documentation. Using the 
figures from table 2.5 of the Autumn Statement, the Government has estimated that the 
cumulative cost of abolishing the cap on student numbers between 2013–14 and 2018–19 
to be £5.55 billion:111 
Table 3: The impact on central government Net Cash Requirement of policy decisions 
 
Source: HM Treasury, Autumn Statement 2013, Cm 8747, December 2013, table 2.5 
  
110 HM Treasury, Autumn Statement 2013, Cm 8747, December 2013, para 1.203 
111 HM Treasury, Autumn Statement 2013, Cm 8747, December 2013, table 2.5 
Financial transactions
Higher education: abolish the cap
on student numbers
Gross proceeds from the sale of the
student loan book2
Green investment bank3
Start Up loans
Affordable rent to buy3
Unlocking large housing sites4
TOTAL POLICY DECISIONS
2013-14
0
0
0
-10
0
0
-10
2014-15
-180
0
0
0
0
-60
-240
2015-16
-600
+2,300
-800
-10
-300
-255
+335
2016-17
-1,170
+2,300
0
-40
-180
-255
+655
2017-18
-1,670
+2,300
0
-50
0
-255
+325
2018-19
-1,930
2,300
0
-50
0
-255
+65
i
ii
iii
iv
v
vi
£ million
1 Costings reﬂect the OBR’s latest economic and ﬁscal determinants.
2 the Government expects to receive c. 12billion in proceeds over 5 years, with a ﬁrst sale by 2o15-16. the proceeds are evenly distributed
across a 5-year period for modelling purposes.
3 These ﬁnancial transactions were previously announced at Spending Round 2013.
4 This measure was announced at Spending Round 2013, and is being extended at autumn Statement 2013.
Financial transanctions: impact on central government Net Cash Requirement1
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81. When he came before us, the Minister explained the Government’s thinking: 
This is how it is done. When we are planning to sell assets, we identify them 
in Government documents as assets we intend to sell, and that enters the 
fiscal arithmetic when there is a reasonable certainty that they will be sold.112 
We asked whether any contingency planning had been done to prepare for the event that 
the accounting officer found that the loans would be better off in public hands. 
82. The Director of Higher Education, Matthew Hilton, told us that no contingency 
planning had been done, but that the policy decision had been made so the funding would 
be found by HM Treasury: 
It would be fair to say that the Treasury do intend to underwrite this policy. 
If there is a shock to their expected budgets that changes some of the 
planning that they have in hand, we would have to sit down and talk to them, 
as would any Department; but there is no logical flow through from a 
decision on the loan book to a decision on the expansion of HE budgets.113 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer appeared to disagree when he stated that “the additional 
outlay of loans over the forecast period will be more than financed by proceeds from the 
sale of the pre-reform income-contingent student loan book”.114 
83. This inconsistency from within the Government has left us unclear as to how closely 
these policies are linked. The Minister wrote to us after he gave evidence and said that “the 
announcement on removing the cap on student numbers is fully funded”.115 He explained: 
There are three types of expenditure which impact on Higher Education 
budgets and all are fully funded as part of the Autumn Statement 
announcement [Minister’s emphasis]. These are: 
• Grants such as HEFCE teaching grant and maintenance grants for student support 
• Outlay of loans to students 
• The RAB charge116 
84. Given that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has linked the removal of the student 
numbers cap to the sale of the income-contingent loan-book, we seek clarification from 
the Department whether the removal of the cap is dependent on the sale of the loan book. 
85. If the policy is not dependent on the sale, the Government must set out in its response 
where it will raise the £5.55 billion between now and 2018–19 required to remove the cap 
without putting an additional burden on the taxpayer.  
112 Q111 
113 Q113 
114 HM Treasury, Autumn Statement 2013, Cm 8747, December 2013, para 1.203 
115 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (SLB 0007) extract 
116 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (SLB 0007) extract 
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Presentation of data 
86. It is essential that Government is seen to be transparent and that it presents 
information around student loans in a clear and understandable way. The presentation of 
data on the future sale of student loans was criticised by Dr McGettigan: 
The main issue there is that the declared proceeds of this sale projected over 
the five years, starting in 2015–16, as outlined in table 2.5 of the Autumn 
Statement, are gross proceeds. They are not net proceeds, so what is not 
included in those tables is the income stream you have sold to the private 
provider. There is another £1.7 billion from 2016–17 and 2017–18 and 2018–
19 that you have to net out of that gross calculation, because that is precisely 
what you have sold to the purchasers. There will then be subsequent 
repayments in future years that are also now going to the purchasers and not 
to the Government.117 
87. The Minister assured us that he “did not commit the kind of schoolboy howler that Mr 
McGettigan claims” but that “different elements of the calculation [were] to be found in 
different Autumn Statement documents”.118 The Minister conceded that it would be more 
helpful if all of the information was presented in a single space and has subsequently 
submitted that information to us: 119 
Table 4: Relaxation of Student Number Controls: Impact on Public Finances: Grants for 
teaching and maintenance—funded by HM Treasury 
 
Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (SLB 0007) table 1 
Table 5: Relaxation of Student Number Controls: Impact on Public Finances: Student loans 
(cash)—costs offset by planned loan-book sale
 
Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (SLB 0007) table 2  
117 Q9 
118 Q114 
119 Q114 
Costs(£m)
Year 13-14 14-15 15-16 16-17 17-18 18-19
HEFCE and maintenance
(inc Barnett consequence) 0 -120 -290 -720- -
Costs(£m)
Year 13-14 14-15 15-16 16-17 17-18 Total
Outlay of loans* 0
0
-300
-300
-180
0
-200
-380
-600
+2,300
-200
+1,500
-3,620
+6,900
-1,800
+1,480
-1,170
+2,300
-400
+730
-1,670
+2,300
-700
-70
Gross proceeds from ICR
Sale **
Revisions to student loan
repayments compared to
March 2013 forecast***
Net impact
* Figures from table Autumn Statement 2013. Table 2.5.
** the government expects to receive c.£12 billion in proceeds over five years, with a first sale by 2015-16. The proceeds are
evenly distributed across the five year period for modelling purposes. Figures from Autumn Statement 2013 Table 2.5.
*** This incorporates a number of revisions to the repayment forecast, including lower repayments due to the sale of tranches
of the student loan book. figures fron OBR Economic and fiscal Outlook report December 2013. Table 4.32.
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88. The Government could have been clearer in the presentation of its figures on the 
policy of the loan book-sale and student numbers. We recommend that, in future, the 
Government clearly presents the net financial outcome of any such policy, rather than 
spreading the figures around different tables across large official documents. 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
Forecasting implications of the RAB charge 
1. The evidence that we have received, both in this inquiry and previous inquiries, 
suggests that there has been a persistent miscalculation of the Department’s estimates 
of the RAB charge. The resulting holes in the budget are only just beginning to 
materialise. Forecasters, particularly HEPI, had and continue to have a more accurate 
picture of repayments. Despite this, the Department has ignored their concerns. We 
recommend that, as a matter of urgency, the Department conducts a full review of all 
the financial assumptions underpinning the Department’s RAB model. (Paragraph 
17) 
Budgetary implications of the RAB charge 
2. We support the Chief Secretary to the Treasury’s ambition of improving the 
incentives for managing the long term costs of new student loans, and encourage the 
Treasury to look for further ways to strengthen these incentives. However, we are 
concerned that the current arrangements may have an adverse impact on unrelated 
BIS budgets in the medium term. (Paragraph 21) 
3. In order to improve transparency and accountability, we recommend that the 
Department publishes HM Treasury’s targets for impairments for student loans 
alongside reports against actual performance. (Paragraph 22) 
Monitoring and reporting of the Student Loans Company against 
targets 
4. For the NAO to conclude that the targets set for the Student Loans Company by the 
Department may have been misleading is a damning finding. It is obvious to us that 
the Department must address this as a matter of urgency. (Paragraph 26) 
Targeting repayments 
5. The NAO has highlighted under-performance in terms of the collection of loans and 
the need for an annual target of money collected in a year together with an 
explanation of any variance. We support that recommendation and look to the 
Department to set clear targets for the SLC as a matter of urgency and to publish the 
earnings and collection assumptions behind those targets. (Paragraph 30) 
Graduates now living overseas 
6. The Government is finding it harder to collect from debtors who have moved abroad 
and the complicated structure of income-contingent loans adds to that difficulty. We 
therefore recommend that the Government assesses whether converting income-
contingent debt to mortgage-style debt for borrowers leaving the country would aid 
collection of outstanding student loans. (Paragraph 41)  
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Absence of information 
7. It is clear from our evidence and that of the Committee of Public Accounts that the 
overall approach to collecting student debt lacks rigour. It is the case that the SLC is 
required to meet targets set by the Department and it is true that the SLC has met 
most of these targets. However, we conclude that the SLC’s targets are not fit for 
purpose and need urgent review. (Paragraph 46) 
International comparisons 
8. It is regrettable that the Government did not do more to learn from examples of best 
practice overseas. The Government should examine examples of good practice 
overseas, including in the United States of America, in order to assess whether 
elements could be incorporated into the working culture of the SLC. (Paragraph 50) 
Removing the cap on the numbers of students 
9. The arrangements for the efficient collection of the student loan scheme are not 
working and the current system of ‘debt’ and ‘repayment’ is not being managed 
effectively. It is clear that an overhaul of the system is needed, especially in light of 
the Minister’s assessment that the level of student debt will increase to approximately 
£330 billion by 2044. (Paragraph 54) 
10. The Student Loans Company should be fair but robust in fulfilling its duty to achieve 
value for money and must demonstrate a strategic shift to a more dynamic culture in 
its duties to achieve the best value for the taxpayer through the most efficient 
collection of repayments. The Department should assist with this by realigning the 
formal targets to demonstrate this expectation and drive through a change of culture. 
(Paragraph 55) 
11. The United Kingdom is approaching a tipping point for the financial viability of the 
student loans system and the removal of the cap on student numbers will put even 
greater pressure on the system. There is a need for an urgent review of the 
sustainability of the system. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the 
Government must come back with a clear timescale for this review.(Paragraph 56) 
Historical sale of the mortgage-style loan-book 
12. It is clear that the private sector can see a profit in collecting student loan debts that 
the Government cannot. These findings reinforce our previous conclusions on the 
performance of the SLC’s debt collection. It also lends weight to the Minister’s 
ambition for the Student Loans Company to be removed from this aspect of the 
student loan system for mortgage-style loans which may be extended to the income-
contingent loans. (Paragraph 64) 
13. We recommend that the Department outlines what rate of repayment it was 
achieving on the £890 million of mortgage-style loans which have now been sold. 
This may then be used as a benchmark to consider the future sales of income-
contingent loans. We further recommend that the Minister sets out the minimum 
level of performance he expects of the SLC in pursuing the income-contingent loans 
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before he would consider moving all debt collection to the private sector. (Paragraph 
65) 
Terms and conditions 
14. The Minister has been clear in his public statements that the Department would not 
change any of the terms and conditions attached to the loans as a result of any sale. 
While it is the case that Ministers will retain the power to change the terms and 
conditions, this is not a new provision. We recommend that there should be no 
change in the terms and conditions of existing student loans without parliamentary 
approval. (Paragraph 69) 
Proposed sale of the income-contingent loan-book 
15. The Government appears to have committed itself to the sale of the income 
contingent loans before it has fully assessed the financial viability of such a move. 
Demand for these assets is untested and without the introduction of a synthetic 
hedge would only realise around £2 billion of the £12 billion return expected by 
Government. While demand would increase with the introduction of a synthetic 
hedge, this would come with an additional long-term cost to Government, which has 
yet to be quantified. (Paragraph 78) 
16. The Government has told us that it has moved to the sale preparation stage with 
more up-to-date analysis underway. This analysis must produce a succinct but 
penetrative assessment of the market and we recommend that it be done as a matter 
of urgency. Without such an analysis, there is no guarantee that the Government will 
make any of the financial returns that it claims. We further recommend that if the 
Government proposes to introduce a ‘synthetic hedge’ or similar it must share its 
scenario testing and specifically publish its estimate of the best-case and worst-case 
costing scenarios for this policy. (Paragraph 79) 
Linking the student-loans to the removal of the cap on student 
numbers 
17. Given that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has linked the removal of the student 
numbers cap to the sale of the income-contingent loan-book, we seek clarification 
from the Department whether the removal of the cap is dependent on the sale of the 
loan book. (Paragraph 84) 
18. If the policy is not dependent on the sale, the Government must set out in its 
response where it will raise the £5.55 billion between now and 2018–19 required to 
remove the cap without putting an additional burden on the taxpayer. (Paragraph 
85) 
Presentation of data 
19. The Government could have been clearer in the presentation of its figures on the 
policy of the loan book-sale and student numbers. We recommend that, in future, 
the Government clearly presents the net financial outcome of any such policy, rather 
than spreading the figures around different tables across large official documents. 
(Paragraph 88)  
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Annex A: Timeline of student loan 
policies 
• 1990: Student loans introduced to support students. 
• 1990–1998: ‘Mortgage-style’ loans issued. Borrowers earning above a threshold 
amount repay a fixed monthly amount over a fixed period. Approximately £4 billion 
paid out. 
• 1998 & 1999: Two sales passed a passed a large proportion of mortgage-style student 
loan-book to the private sector. 
• 1998–present: ‘Income-contingent’ loans issued. Repayments and interest charges 
depend on borrowers’ earnings. Borrowers only repay once earning above a set 
threshold. Approximately £51 billion paid out to date. 
• Nov 2013: The Government announced the sale of the remaining mortgage style loans 
to a private investment consortium. Book value of £890 million sold for £160 million. 
• Nov 2013: The National Audit Office (NAO) published a report on student loan 
repayments. It published a review of the processes behind collection and made 
recommendations to improve. 
• Dec 2013–present: The Government confirmed that the Department was preparing to 
sell early cohorts of the income-contingent repayment loan book. This sale should 
depend entirely on the Department’s ability to prove value for money, and the 
Permanent Secretary, as Accounting Officer, will take a sale decision in due course. 
• Jan 2014: The Business, Innovation and Skills Committee conducted an inquiry into 
student loans.120 
  
 
120 Source National Audit Office and Business, Innovation and Skills Committee analysis 
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Annex B: Student loans accounting 
entries from 2013–14 
As with all government Departments, BIS’ budget is split into resource (short-term) and 
capital (long-term). Each of these categories is further split into DEL (where risk lies 
primarily with the Department) and AME (where risk lies primarily with Treasury). The 
accounting treatment of student loans is important because it determines whether there 
are sufficient incentives for managing the long term costs of student loans. 
Table 6: HM Treasury Consolidated Budgeting Guidance 
Source: Business Innovation and Skills Committee analysis of HM Treasury, Consolidated budgeting guidance 
2014–15, paras 8.9–8.20 
Negative entries are shown in green 
 Parliamentary Control Accounts 
 Resource DEL Resource AME Capital AME Expenditure Student Loans 
Asset 
Loans issued + impairments of 
issued loans 
 cash value of the 
loans issued 
impairment cash value -
impairment 
Interest receivable  - interest receivable Interest receivable 
(capitalised 
because it is 
effectively new 
lending) 
 + interest 
receivable 
Unwinding the 
discount 
 -  discount unwound 
at the 
government’s long 
term cost of 
borrowing (2.2 per 
cent per year) 
  + discount 
unwound 
Repayment of student 
loans  
  - cash repayment 
of loans or 
capitalised interest 
  
Particular loan written 
off  
No entries 
Revaluation or 
impairments (pre-
2012 ICR loans)  
Additional 
impairment (cost) 
  + impairment - impairment 
 
Revaluation or 
impairment – first 
year (post-2012 loans) 
1/30th of 
impairment (each 
year for 30 years) 
29/30th of 
impairment 
 + impairment - impairment 
 
Revaluation or 
impairment – 
subsequent years 
(post -2012 loans) 
1/30th of 
impairment (each 
year for 30 years) 
- 1/30th of 
impairment (each 
year for 30 years) 
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Formal Minutes 
Tuesday 15 July 2014 
Members present: 
Mr Adrian Bailey, in the Chair 
Mr William Bain 
Mr Brian Binley 
Paul Blomfield 
Mike Crockart 
Caroline Dinenage 
 Rebecca Harris 
Ann McKechin 
Robin Walker 
Nadhim Zahawi 
 
Draft Report (Student Loans), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read. 
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. 
Paragraphs 1 to 88 read and agreed to.  
Summary agreed to.  
Annexes agreed to 
Resolved, That the Report be the Third Report of the Committee to the House. 
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House. 
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of 
Standing Order No. 134. 
 [Adjourned till Tuesday 22 July at 10.00 am 
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Witnesses 
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the Committee’s 
inquiry page at www.parliament.uk/bis. 
Tuesday 17 December 2013 Question number 
Bahram Bekhradnia, Director, Higher Education Policy Institute, Dr Andrew 
McGettigan, Author and Expert on University Funding, and Toni Pearce, President, 
National Union of Students Q1-93 
Tuesday 14 January 2014 
Rt Hon David Willetts MP, Minister for Universities and Science, Matthew Hilton, 
Director, Higher Education, and Michael Harrison, Executive Director, Shareholder 
Executive, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Q94-167 
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Published written evidence 
The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the Committee’s 
inquiry web page at www.parliament.uk/bis. INQ numbers are generated by the evidence 
processing system and so may not be complete. 
1 Andrew McGettigan (SLB0001) 
2 Department For Business, Innovation And Skills (SLB0007) 
3 Higher Education Policy Institute (SLB0002) 
4 National Union Of Students (SLB0004) 
5 National Union Of Students (SLB0006) 
6 Professor Neil Shephard (SLB0005) 
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proposed Adjudicator for the Groceries Code 
HC 1224-I 
Tenth Report Pub Companies HC 1369-I/II (Cm 8222) 
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Report of Session 2010-12 
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